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LOOKING AT THE MONOPSONY IN THE MIRROR 
 
Maurice E. Stucke * 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Although still a distant second to monopoly, buyer power and 
monopsony are hot topics in the antitrust community.1  The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),2 International 
Competition Network (ICN),3 and American Antitrust Institute (AAI)4 have 
studied recently monopsony and buyer power.  The U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) pay more attention to 
buyer power in their 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.5  With growing 
buyer concentration in commodities like coffee, tea, and cocoa, and among 
retailers, buyer power is a human rights issue.6  
                                                 
*
 Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow, 
American Antitrust Institute.  I wish to thank for their helpful comments Adi Ayal, Peter 
Carstensen, Kenneth Davidson, Thomas Horton, John Kirkwood, Russell Pittman, Robert 
Steiner, Spencer Weber Waller, and the participants of the symposium, Buyer Power in 
Competition Law, sponsored by the University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law & 
Policy.  I also thank the University of Tennessee College of Law for the summer research 
grant. 
1
 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Monopsony and Buyer Power, DAF/COMP(2008)38, at 
255 (2008), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/63/44445750.pdf (European 
Commission’s submission) (“Buying power is an increasingly hot topic within the 
competition community.”). 
2
 Id. at 208 (Netherlands). 
3
 ICN Special Program for Kyoto Annual Conference, Report on Abuse of Superior 
Bargaining Position Prepared by Task Force for Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position 
(2008). 
4
 AAI Invitational Symposium on Buyer Power, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (2008); 
Albert A. Foer, Introduction to Symposium on Buyer Power and Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 505 (2005). 
5
 Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
§ 0.1 (issued Apr. 2, 1992, revised Apr. 8, 1997) (noting in one short paragraph that “to 
assess potential monopsony concerns, the Agency will apply an analytical framework 
analogous to the framework of these Guidelines) with U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§ 8 & 12 (2010), available at 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf (extended discussion of buyer 
power). 
6
 Olivier de Schutter, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains:  The Role of Competition Law in 
2 MONOPSONY [20-Aug-12 
Recently the DOJ and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
investigated buyer power in the agriculture industry’s seed, hog, livestock, 
poultry, and dairy sectors.7  Professor Peter Carstensen, among others, 
expressed relief:  “For years many of us who follow agricultural 
competition issues have lamented the failure of both antitrust enforcement 
and market facilitating regulation to deal with continuing problems that 
farmers and ranchers confront in both the acquisition of inputs and the 
marketing of their production.”8  Over 4,000 people attended the public 
workshops in Iowa, Alabama, Wisconsin, Colorado, and Washington, D.C.  
The DOJ received over 18,000 public comments.9  Participants complained 
about the lack of antitrust enforcement, “a severely concentrated 
marketplace in which power and profit are limited to a few at the expense of 
countless, hard working family farmers,” and how mergers, left 
unchallenged, led to “high input prices, low commodity prices, or other 
hardships, having invested particular suppliers or buyers with greater 
market power.”10  The U.S. livestock industry, observed several states, is 
more concentrated currently than in 1921, when Congress enacted the 
Packers and Stockyards Act to respond to a market the “Big Five” packers 
                                                                                                                            
Tackling the Abuse of Buyer Power, Briefing Note 03 (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/documents-issued/briefing-notes; Aravind R. Ganesh, 
The Right to Food and Buyer Power, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1190 (2010); South Centre & 
Traidcraft, Rebalancing the Supply Chain: Buyer Power, Commodities & Competition 
Policy (Apr. 2008); Duncan Green, Oxfam, Conspiracy of Silence: Old & New Directions 
on Commodities 39-40 (2005). 
7
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Division Update, Spring 2011, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2011/ag-workshops.html. 
8
 Peter C. Carstensen, Comments for the United States Departments of Agriculture and 
Justice Workshops on Competition Issues in Agriculture, Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 1103 (Jan. 15, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537191 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1537191. 
9
 Division Update, supra note 7. 
10
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Competition and Agriculture: Voices from the 
Workshops on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement in our 21st Century Economy and 
Thoughts on the Way Forward 5 (May 2012), available at 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf. 
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controlled and to ensure fair competition and fair trade practices in the 
marketing of livestock, meat, and poultry.11 
Despite the increasing interest in monopsony and buyer power, the 
larger jurisdictions have challenged few mergers or conduct cases that target 
buyer power.12  The DOJ and USDA workshops ended with a whimper.13  
And one recent DOJ monopsony case yielded an unusually weak behavioral 
remedy.14 The DOJ, however, in 2012 promised “vigorous antitrust 
                                                 
11
 Comments Regarding Competition in the Agriculture Industry by Attorneys General 
from Montana, Iowa, Maine Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia 6 (Mar. 11, 
2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/016/AGW-15683.html; 
International Federation of Agricultural Producers, Sixth Draft Report on “Industrial 
Concentration in the Agri-Food Sector” 4 (May 2002) (noting that four firms control over 
80 percent of the U.S. cattle slaughter business, nearly 60 percent of the pork packing 
industry, and 50 percent of production and processing of broiler chickens, and process 74 
percent of all U.S. corn, 62 percent of U.S. wheat, and 80 percent of U.S. soybeans). 
12
 Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust:  The 
Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 271, 272 
(2008) (observing how “the merger enforcement decisions by the courts and agencies have 
failed to appreciate the buyer power issues presented in some merger cases”). 
13
 David Andrews, Antitrust Efforts Have Gone in Dustbin of History, NAT’L CATH. 
REP., Mar. 6, 2012, available at http://ncronline.org/news/politics/antitrust-efforts-have-
gone-dustbin-history. 
14
 In challenging an acquisition, the United States originally asked the court to divest 
assets sufficient to restore competition in the affected chicken processing market and to 
enjoin the defendant from further ownership and operation of the assets acquired as part of 
the transaction. Compl., United States v. George’s Food, LLC, Civ. Action No. 5:11-cv-
00043-gec (W.D. Va. filed May 10, 2011). But the DOJ later settled for a behavioral 
remedy, namely requiring defendant to make several capital improvements to its 
Harrisonburg chicken processing plant.  Defendant had to (i) install an individually frozen 
freezer, (ii) install “a whole leg or thigh deboning line with the capacity to debone a 
minimum of fifty legs per minute or new automated lines with similar capacities,” and (iii) 
repair the processing plant’s roof.  Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. 
George’s Foods, LLC, Civ. Act. No. 5:11-cv-00043-GEC, at 7 (W.D. Va. filed June 23, 
2011). The settlement, the DOJ asserted, was in the public interest as it significantly 
increased the number of chickens that George’s would process, thereby increasing the 
demand for grower services and averting the likely adverse competitive effects arising from 
the acquisition.  Carstensen and a former FTC official objected to both the remedy’s scope 
and duration. They argued that among other things the consent decree should require the 
DOJ to reassess the transaction’s competitive effects in three to five years and, if necessary, 
revise the remedy.  The DOJ rejected their concerns, “confident that the effectiveness of 
the proposed Final Judgment obviates the need for requiring undefined ‘additional 
remedies.’”  Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comment on the Proposed Final 
Judgment, United States v. George’s Foods, LLC, Civ. Act. No. 5:11-cv-00043-GEC 
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enforcement” after “redoubl[ing] its already active enforcement 
activities.”15  
One challenge, given the relatively few antitrust cases that target 
monopsony power, is that the legal standards for monopsony claims are less 
developed than for monopoly claims.  In recent years, courts, competition 
agencies, and scholars in addressing monopsony begin with a simple 
premise:  Monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly.16  In the leading 
monopsony case, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co., Inc., the Supreme Court’s initial premise was that monopoly and 
                                                                                                                            
(W.D. Va. filed Oct. 25, 2011). 
15
 DOJ, Competition and Agriculture, supra note 10, at 23. 
16
 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross–Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 
321-22 (2007) (quoting John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: 
Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and 
Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 653 (2005); Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 
1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[M]onopsony pricing ... is analytically the same as monopoly 
or cartel pricing and [is] so treated by the law”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
522 U.S. 3 (1997); Vogel v.  American Soc. of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 
1984) (“[M]onopoly and monopsony are symmetrical distortions of competition from an 
economic standpoint”)); GMA Cover Corp. v. Saab Barracuda LLC, 4:10-CV-12060, 2012 
WL 642739 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2012), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. 
GMA Cover Corp. v. Saab Barracuda, LLC, 10-CV-12060, 2012 WL 639528 (E.D. Mich. 
Feb. 28, 2012); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 324 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(quoting Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (Because 
“the equation for measuring market power in monopsony is a mirror image of the 
relationships that create market power in a seller[,] ... [a] greater availability of substitute 
buyers indicates a smaller quantum of market power on the part of the buyers in question.” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted))); In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. 
Supp. 2d 705, 724 (E.D. Tenn. 2011); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 
F. Supp. 274, 280 n.9 (D. Mass. 1995); Federal Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Improving Health Care: A Dose Of Competition 13 (July 2004), 2004 WL 1685795 
(F.T.C.), at 122 [hereinafter Health Report]; Marius Schwartz, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Antitrust Div., Economics Director of Enforcement, Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-
Prudential Merger, Presented at 5th Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern 
University School of Law (Nov. 30, 1999), 1999 WL 34804330 (D.O.J.), at * 2 (“The 
textbook case of monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly.”); OECD, Monopsony, 
supra note 1, at 245 (United States); see also id. at 256 (European Commission); Roger G. 
Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 589 (2005); Dennis 
W. Carlton & Mark Israel, Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review, 39 REV. 
IND. ORGAN. 127, 128 (2011); but see Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 5 
(mantra that buyer power is the mirror image of seller power obscures the need for 
differentiating market power in buyer and seller situations). 
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monopsony power were economically similar and shared a close theoretical 
connection.17  Given the “kinship” between monopoly and monopsony 
power, the Court suggested “that similar legal standards should apply” to 
monopolization and monopsonization claims.18 
But as this Article contends, courts and agencies should be careful when 
importing monopolization standards for monopsony cases. What works for 
monopolization claims may not necessarily work for monopsony claims. 
This Article first defines monopsony and buyer power and discusses their 
economic, social, and moral harm.  Part II then discusses a key issue: How 
much market share must defendant possess to be a monopsony?  An 
antitrust plaintiff challenging a monopsony (or monopoly) under section 2 
of the Sherman Act19 must first show that the defendant possesses 
monopsony (or monopoly) power. If courts and agencies assume that 
monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly, should the agencies and 
courts use the same market share thresholds for monopsonization claims as 
in monopolization claims?  If a 50 percent market share is insufficient for 
monopolization claims, should they similarly conclude that a 50 percent 
market share is insufficient for monopsonization claims? As Part II 
examines, requiring high market share thresholds for monopsony claims 
increases the risk of false negatives. 
Part III considers another key issue:  should agencies and courts use 
                                                 
17
 549 U.S. 312, 321-22 (2007). 
18
 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 322 (“[A]symmetric treatment of monopoly and 
monopsony has no basis in economic analysis”) (quoting Noll, supra note 16, at 591).  The 
Court noted the “strikingly similar allegations” involving predatory-pricing and predatory-
bidding. 549 U.S. at 322. Given the “general theoretical similarities of monopoly and 
monopsony combined with the theoretical and practical similarities of predatory pricing 
and predatory bidding,” the Court applied its two-pronged predatory pricing test to 
predatory-bidding claims. Id. at 325.  Nonetheless, the Court erred.  ROGER D. BLAIR & 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 77-78  (2010) (describing 
how predatory buyer can purchase other significant inputs at a competitive price so that its 
output price is above total cost). 
19
 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
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consumer harm as a threshold screen for monopsony claims?   Among the 
principles the D.C. Circuit observed from “a century of case law on 
monopolization under § 2,” is that a monopolist’s act must “harm the 
competitive process and thereby harm consumers.”20 Another risk in 
assuming monopsony as the mirror image of monopoly is when the 
competition agencies and courts use consumer harm to screen monopsony 
claims.  As Part III discusses, a consumer welfare screen, contrary to its 
aim, increases, rather than decreases, the risks and costs of false positives 
and negatives.  It promotes greater subjectivity and reduces predictability 
and transparency. The deficiencies of a consumer welfare screen are 
compounded when one shifts from the neoclassical economic theory’s 
assumption of economic self-interest to the more realistic behavioral 
economic findings of consumers’ other-regarding behavior and concerns 
over fairness. 
I. MONOPSONY & BUYER POWER 
A.  Monopsony 
Monopsony often is characterized as the mirror image of monopoly.21 
Under its textbook economic definition, the monopsonist purchases fewer 
widgets than buyers otherwise would purchase in a competitive market; as a 
result, the monopsonist forces down the price of the sellers’ widgets.22  The 
sellers have little, if any, market power.23  They decide how many widgets 
                                                 
20
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
21
 See supra note 16. 
22
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 256 (European Commission); Zhiqi Chen, 
Defining Buyer Power, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 241, 243 (2008) (“defining characteristic of 
monopsony power . . . is the depression of quantity purchased by a buyer.”); Steven C. 
Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 672 (2005). 
The monopolist, in contrast, normally reduces its output below competitive levels to raise 
its product’s price above competitive level.  European Commission, Directorate-General 
for Competition, Glossary of Terms Used in EU Competition Policy, Antitrust and Control 
of Concentrations 32 (July 2002) (monopoly), available at 
ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/glossary_en.pdf. 
23
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 256 (European Commission); Chen, supra note 
22, at 242.  The price can be competitive but provide economic rent on the supply side of 
20-Aug-12] MONOPSONY 7 
to sell at the per unit price.24  The widget industry’s aggregate supply curve 
is upward sloping, in that sellers will produce more widgets if offered a 
higher price to cover the increase in their marginal cost.25  The monopsonist 
profits more by buying fewer widgets at the lower price per unit and selling 
less of its final product than in buying more widgets, albeit at a higher price, 
and selling more output. 
B.  Buyer Power 
Buyer power has different definitions.26  One definition is the “[a]bility 
of one or more buyers, based on their economic importance on the market 
in question, to obtain favourable purchasing terms from their suppliers.”27  
Buyer power is about superior bargaining position and terms relative to 
rivals and/or the competitive norm.28  This can occur when a purchaser 
obtains a lower net price or better terms compared to its rivals. 
The terms buyer power—along with countervailing power—are used 
favorably, such as when “powerful buyers may discipline the pricing policy 
of powerful sellers, thus creating a ‘balance of powers’ on the market 
concerned.”29  Alternatively, powerful buyers “can credibly threaten to 
                                                                                                                            
the market.  As Noll points out, the company has little incentive to become a monopolist if 
there was no consumer surplus to capture. Noll, supra note 16, at 592.  “Likewise, rent is 
present in a market if, in the aggregate, suppliers of the product receive more revenues than 
are necessary to induce them to provide the quantity of goods that is sold.”  Id.  That is 
certainly true.  The monopsonist (like the monopolist) appropriates wealth from the seller 
(customer) to itself.  The more surplus to be had, the greater the 
monopolist’s/monopsonist’s potential profits.  
24
 Id. at 594.  The monopsonist pays a single price per unit; it pays the same price for 
the first and last widget it purchases that year.  Carlton & Israel, supra note 16, at 129. 
25
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 256 (European Commission); Chen, supra note 
22, at 243. 
26
 Chen, supra note 22, at 241; Noll, supra note 16, at 589 (noting that term is “rarely 
precisely defined”).  
27
 EC Glossary, supra note 22, at 7. 
28
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 201 (Korea), at 246 (United States) (“the 
ability of a buyer to negotiate a favourable price that is nevertheless above the competitive 
level”), at 256 (European Commission) (“where a purchasing agreement accounts for a 
sufficiently large proportion of total volume of a purchasing market so that prices can be 
driven down below the competitive level.”) (emphasis added).   
29
 EC Glossary, supra note 22, at 7; European Commission, Guidelines on the 
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integrate backward and produce the industry’s product themselves if 
vendors are too profitable,” observed Professor Michael Porter.30 
This Article focuses on the dark side of buyer power:  “Where a strong 
buyer faces weak sellers, for example, the outcome can be worse than where 
the buyer is not powerful.”31  The buyers depress below the competitive 
level the prices they pay, as in the case of “the cattle, hog, or poultry farmer 
who faces the buying power of the relatively few processors of agricultural 
commodities.”32 
C.  Traditional Economic Concerns of Monopsony and Buyer Power 
Under the textbook economic definition, the monopsonist, in depressing 
the price of widgets, transfers wealth from the widget suppliers to itself.  
The monopsonist will not pass along the lower input price to its 
downstream consumers.33  Moreover since fewer widgets are produced and 
sold, society suffers a deadweight welfare loss.34   
Problems arise once one deviates from the textbook definition.  The 
                                                                                                                            
Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of 
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004/C 31/03 §§ 11.c, 64-67 (2004); ICN, 
Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 3: Assessment 
of Dominance, presented at the 10th Annual ICN Conference (May 2011).  Mergers among 
buyers can yield efficiencies and lower input prices without increasing buyer power. See 
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (mergers between buyers may not “enhance 
market power on the buying side of the market [but] can nevertheless lead to a reduction in 
prices paid by the merged firm, for example, by reducing transactions costs or allowing the 
merged firm to take advantage of volume-based discounts”). 
30
 Michael E. Porter, The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan. 2008, at 84; 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 8 (merging parties’ 
ability to exercise market power constrained “if powerful buyers have the ability and 
incentive to vertically integrate upstream or sponsor entry, or if the conduct or presence of 
large buyers undermines coordinated effects”). 
31
 EC Glossary, supra note 22, at 7. 
32
 Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 277. 
33
 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 47 (2010); de Schutter, supra note 6, at 2; 
John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809985 [hereinafter Merger]. 
34
 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 43-45; DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 
16, at 13-14 (when the monopsonist reduces input prices, “society foregoes the production 
of output whose value to consumers exceeds the resource costs of associated inputs, 
thereby creating a welfare loss to society”). 
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European Commission states that if “increased buyer power lowers input 
costs without restricting downstream competition or total output, then a 
proportion of these cost reductions are likely to be passed onto consumers 
in the form of lower prices.”35  This is not always true.  As the U.S. 
competition agencies recognize, significant buyer power, even to point of 
monopsony, does not always lead to less output of the sellers’ or 
monopsonist’s goods.36  This can be important when evaluating competitive 
effects. 
First, the supply curve of the sellers’ widgets may be inelastic.  Here 
buyer power depresses the sellers’ price of widgets but not the total amount 
of widgets produced.  So, unlike the textbook monopsony, society does not 
bear a welfare deadweight loss.  There is, however, a wealth transfer from 
widget suppliers to the powerful buyers, and consumers do not necessarily 
benefit from the exercise of buyer power.37 
Second, a monopsonist, like a monopolist, can price discriminate to get 
a non-cost-justified price decrease--namely paying each widget seller only 
the minimum amount needed for that seller to produce the widget.  As 
economist Roger Noll discusses, the monopsonist can target (i) more 
efficient widget suppliers and extract from them their incremental profits 
(Ricardian rents),38 (ii) widget suppliers with lower short-run costs and 
extract from them their quasi-rents,39 and (iii) any supra-competitive profits 
earned by the widget suppliers.40  Under these scenarios, the more efficient 
                                                 
35
 EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 29, at § 62. 
36
 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (“The Agencies do not view a short-
run reduction in the quantity purchased as the only, or best, indicator of whether a merger 
enhances buyer market power.”). 
37
 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 50; OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 141 
(Canada). 
38
 Noll, supra note 16, at 593.  
39
 Id. (describing quasi-rents as “the difference between a supplier’s total revenues and 
short-run total costs”).  
40
 Id. at 593-94, 603. 
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suppliers are punished.  A fluid milk processing monopsony, for example, 
can demand a lower price from the more efficient dairy farmers who 
obtained through their investments more milk, at a lower cost, from better 
cows.  The farmer is not rewarded from her efficiency.  The monopsonist 
milk processor simply appropriates the efficient farmer’s extra profits for 
itself.  Similarly the monopsonist milk processor can squeeze the dairy 
farmers so that they do not earn in the short-term a competitive return on 
their milking equipment.  Eventually, when the equipment breaks down, the 
farms close.  The monopsonist can price discriminate by using all-or-
nothing contracts, whereby the farmer must commit to selling a specific 
volume at a specified price (that captures the above-described rents), 
otherwise the monopsonist refuses to purchase anything.41  Buyers can also 
price discriminate by shifting costs and risk to suppliers.  For example, 
powerful retailers can require suppliers to stock the retailers’ shelves and 
take returns.42 
A third economic concern is the “commodity problem,” whereby buyer 
power depresses price by increasing, rather than decreasing, total output. 
Farmers--faced with buyer power and lower prices--increase the supply of 
agricultural commodities. This is unusual.  Neoclassical economic theory 
predicts that monopsony power leads to less output. What appears to drive 
this behavioral anomaly is that each farmer seeks a target income; by 
producing more, the farmers collectively depress price further.  One 
                                                 
41
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 246 (United States); Ganesh, supra note 6, at 
1216-19. 
42
 U.K. Competition Commission, The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market 
Investigation 12 (Apr. 30, 2008), available at www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/.../538.pdf (finding that “the principal manner in which 
excessive risks or unexpected costs could be transferred from grocery retailers to suppliers 
was through retailers making retrospective adjustments to the terms of supply” and 
expressing concern that as a result of the transfer of risk “the retailer has less incentive to 
minimize that risk”); Consumers International, The Relationship Between Supermarkets 
and Suppliers: What are the Implications for Consumers? 6 (July 2012), available at 
http://www.consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/news/2012/07/supermarkets_uk. 
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example is coffee.43  Coffee growers have little alternatives.  Coffee is best 
cultivated on hilly land in high altitudes,44 which limits other alternative 
crops.  Many coffee growers face “limited access to markets for other 
commodities, the perennial nature of coffee plants (and the investment they 
represent), strong cultural attachment to coffee, [and] ‘adding-up’ problems 
(if different countries diversify into the same products).”45  Coffee growers 
also face obstacles in vertically integrating downstream to process their 
coffee.46  In the coffee value chain, economic power has shifted from coffee 
growers to the trading houses (five of which account for 40 percent of green 
coffee imports), roasters (ten of which account for 60 to 65 percent of 
processed coffee sales), and retailers.47  So while coffee importers, roasters, 
and retailers may compete for a share of the rents, they “combine to ensure 
that few of these [rents] accrue to producer countries.”48  When coffee 
growers faced declining prices from concentrated buyers, they produced 
“even more coffee in an attempt to earn short-term income to meet daily 
expenses, and thereby cause[d] oversupply and further depression of coffee 
prices, even below the average cost of production.”49  In 2002, coffee prices 
collapsed to a 100-year low,50 and eight percent more coffee was produced 
                                                 
43
 de Schutter, supra note 6, at 2; Nicolas Petit, Ethiopia’s Coffee Sector:  A Bitter or 
Better Future?, 7 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 225 (2007). 
44
 http://www.coffeeresearch.org/agriculture/environment.htm; 
http://www.ncausa.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=75. 
45
 Petit, supra note 43, at 252; Green, supra note 6, at 21. 
46
 Green, supra note 6, at 21. 
47
 Id. at 40 (noting how in the early 1990s, coffee exporting countries earned about ten 
to twelve billion U.S. dollars, whereas retail coffee sales, mostly in large industrialized 
countries, were about thirty billion U.S. dollars; by 2002, retail sales exceeded $70 billion, 
whereas coffee producing countries received only $5.5 billion); Petit, supra note 43, at 
230-31. 
48
 Green, supra note 6, at 40. 
49
 de Schutter, supra note 6, at 3; South Centre & Traidcraft, supra note 6, at 10; 
Ganesh, supra note 6, at 1196. 
50
 Petit, supra note 43, at 225. 
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than consumed.51 
Some argue that the exercise of monopsony power “usually results” in 
higher retail prices downstream.52  This is clearly so when the monopsonist 
also monopolizes the output market.  The economic harm, for example, of 
the monopsonist milk processor that is also a monopolist is twofold.  The 
monopsonist extracts wealth from the dairy farmers.  It also extracts wealth 
from consumers by charging them higher prices for the fewer gallons of 
milk it sells.53  This concern of a monopsony/monopoly recently arose when 
the health insurer Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan sought to acquire its 
primary competitor, Physicians Health Plan of Mid-Michigan, thereby 
controlling nearly 90 percent of the commercial health insurance market in 
the Lansing, Michigan area.54  The acquisition, the DOJ said, would have 
harmed both consumers (“higher prices, fewer choices, and a reduction in 
the quality of commercial health insurance plans purchased by Lansing area 
residents and their employers”) and sellers (acquisition would give “Blue 
Cross-Michigan the ability to control physician reimbursement rates”).55  
The parties abandoned the transaction, after the DOJ threatened 
prosecution. 
A related concern is that buyer power can lead to downstream market 
power and ultimately a monopsony/monopoly.56  A firm may exercise its 
buyer power to (i) reduce prices downstream, eliminating smaller 
                                                 
51
 Oxfam, Summary Report Mugged: Poverty in Your Coffee Cup 2 (Sept. 2002), 
available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/mugged-poverty-in-your-coffee-
cup. 
52
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 9 (Executive Summary by the Secretariat). 
53
 Id. at 246 (United States); Noll, supra note 16, at 596. 
54
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Press Release, Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Michigan and Physicians Health Plan of Mid-Michigan Abandon Merger Plans--Decision 
to Abandon Deal Follows Justice Department’s Decision to Challenge the Acquisition 
(Mar. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/256259.htm. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Kirkwood, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 16, at 648-49. 
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competitors,57 (ii) encourage sellers to raise their price charged to other, less 
powerful buyers (raising rivals’ costs),58 (iii) extract price cuts such that 
sellers charge higher prices to other, less powerful buyers (the waterbed 
effect),59 or (iv) otherwise foreclose its rivals.60 
Alternatively consumers can pay higher prices even when the 
monopsonist lacks market power downstream.  Suppose, for example, four 
monopsony milk processors supply the same broader geographic market, 
the greater New York region.  Suppose each monopsonist produces less 
milk, as it buys less milk from the dairy farmers in its local market.  With 
each monopsony following this strategy, barring entry by another milk 
processor, less milk will be delivered to supermarkets, cafeterias, and other 
buyers in the greater New York region, causing milk prices to rise. 
The harder case is when buyer power directly harms the sellers but not 
the ultimate consumers.  Suppose local farmers sell their veal calves to the 
local monopsony meat packer.  After slaughtering the calves, and 
processing and packaging the finished cuts of veal, the meat packer sells the 
veal cutlets nationwide.  The local farmer has few options of where to sell 
its calves.  The calves “have a very short time frame of a few weeks when 
they are market ready, so their optimum value quickly drops if they are not 
sold in a timely manner.”61  Suppose then the relevant geographic market 
                                                 
57
 Id.; Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33, at 78-79. 
58
 Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33, at 65-73. 
59
 Paul W. Dobson & Roman Inderst, The Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and Selling 
Power Come Together, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 331, 333 (describing the “waterbed effect” as 
“better supply terms for powerful buyers can lead to a worsening of the terms of supply for 
smaller or otherwise-less-powerful buyers, which might then have an adverse consequence 
for consumers if downstream competition is lessened”). 
60
 EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 29, at § 61 (“Competition in the 
downstream markets could also be adversely affected if, in particular, the merged entity 
were likely to use its buyer power vis-à-vis its suppliers to foreclose its rivals”) 
61
 Comment by Patrick Kilsdonk, dated Dec. 29, 2009 submitted in the DOJ and 
USDA Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement Issues in Our 21st Century Economy 
Workshops, available at  
www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/comments/255233.pdf; see also BLAIR & 
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where the farmer can sell its calves is several hundred kilometers.62  On the 
other hand, the meat packer selling the selected cuts of veal and the retailers 
and institutions that buy the veal can turn to a broader geographic area 
(perhaps thousands of kilometers).63  The meat packer enjoys a monopsony 
in buying calves from local famers, but lacks market power in selling its 
packaged veal, since it competes with other meat packers across the United 
States. The monopsonist supplies fewer selected cuts of veal. But suppose 
that other meat packers sell more veal cutlets so that market output remains 
the same.  This is a big assumption.64  But if the same amount of veal is 
sold, are consumers who buy the veal cutlets harmed? 
 Perhaps.  One potential inefficiency is if other veal calf farmers outside 
the monopsonized market replace the lost production at a higher cost.65 
Other meat packers are increasing output with incremental input that is less 
efficiently procured.  Suppose, for example, farmers in other states with a 
less hospitable climate--higher temperatures and humidity--start raising 
more calves, albeit at a higher cost.66  If their demand is relatively inelastic, 
consumers are harmed when the higher costs from raising the calves are 
passed to them as higher retail prices.  A second inefficiency is the 
                                                                                                                            
HARRISON, supra note 18, at 81 (discussing inelasticity of supply for perishable goods); 
DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 16 (“Seller switching costs for physicians can 
be significant because: (1) a physician’s time is perishable and (2) it can be difficult for a 
physician to quickly replace lost patients.”).  
62
 Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 278. 
63
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 246 (United States). 
64
 As Jack Kirkwood reminded me,  
That assumes the other packers are as efficient as the monopsonist and have the 
excess capacity to make up the lost output at a marginal cost below the market 
price. That could happen, but it would not be common. It assumes that supply is 
perfectly elastic in this market – that any increase in price will immediately 
provoke a compensating increase in supply.  
65
 Carlton & Israel, supra note 16, at 129 n. 5; Noll, supra note 16, at 595-96. 
66
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 144 (Canada) (observing that an “output 
decrease in response to monopsony power in one relevant upstream market that results in 
output increases in other relevant upstream markets is typically the result of inefficient 
substitution towards less efficient producers”). 
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opportunity cost of suppliers who now devote resources in competitive 
markets to produce more of the output (veal calves) when they could have 
profitably devoted their inputs (such as land) to other uses (such as raising 
chicken).67  A third inefficiency is when the sellers (the veal calf farmers) in 
the monopsonized market are squeezed of their Ricardian rents and quasi-
rents.  The farmers now have less money to purchase goods and services.  
In a competitive market, some veal calf farmers would have the profits to 
purchase a new novel, see a movie, and dine at a restaurant.  In the 
monopsonized market, they forego these purchases, since their income 
barely covers basic expenses. The wealthier monopsonist will not take up 
the slack by purchasing more copies of the same book.  To the extent that 
consumers also produce these goods and services, they will be harmed. 
But the downstream harm to consumers is less clear when the 
monopsonist employs “a different technology, using different inputs than its 
output-market rivals.”68  Or the end product competes closely with other 
products. 
D.  Other Economic, Social and Moral Concerns about Monopsony 
The downward pressure on the seller’s price can lead to other 
undesirable effects.  One is an increase in negative externalities.  To reduce 
their costs, more farmers, for example, dispense waste without the 
necessary precautions.69  Sustainability and environmental concerns of 
increased soil erosion, reduced biodiversity, deforestation, and water, soil, 
and air pollution arise.70  
Workers facing financial distress and poverty can impose risk and costs 
                                                 
67
 Noll, supra note 16, at 595. 
68
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 246 (United States). 
69
 de Schutter, supra note 6, at 2. 
70
 Green, supra note 6, at 11, 24-26, Table 2; Petit, supra note 43, at 253 (describing 
environmental degradation in Ethiopia). 
16 MONOPSONY [20-Aug-12 
on others.71  Facing less income and increased uncertainty over future 
earnings, suppliers will have less incentive to innovate or invest in their 
equipment.72 
Quality and consumer choice can also deteriorate, especially when the 
buyer enjoys market power downstream.73  With the concessions it obtains, 
a powerful buyer may seek the quiet life, with less incentive to innovate or 
become more efficient.74 
Also of concern are the sellers’ loss of economic liberty and basic 
human rights, such as the right to food, work, and development.75 Buyer 
power can encourage a race to the bottom for wages, health benefits, 
working conditions, use of child labor, and schooling.76  One account of the 
coffee crisis concluded: 
Families dependent on the money generated by coffee are pulling 
                                                 
71
 Stephan J. Goetz & Hema Swaminathan, Wal-Mart and County-Wide Poverty, 
AERS Staff Paper No. 371 (Oct. 18, 2004), available at 
http://aers.psu.edu/research/centers/cecd/research/wal-mart-and-county-wide-poverty/full-
study/view (results of study suggest that Wal-Mart chain creates costs to taxpayers in the 
form of greater local poverty than would occur absent Wal-Mart). 
72
 Consumers International, supra note 42, at 13-14; South Centre & Traidcraft, supra 
note 6, at 12; UK Competition Commission, supra note 42, at 12 (finding that “the transfer 
of excessive risks or unexpected costs by grocery retailers to their suppliers is likely to 
lessen suppliers’ incentives to invest in new capacity, products and production processes” 
and “if unchecked, these practices would ultimately have a detrimental effect on 
consumers”); Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33, at 85-87. 
73
 W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 104 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“The very nature of monopsony or oligopsony power is that it tends to suppress output and 
reduce quality or choice.”) (quoting Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act's Unintended 
Bias Against Lilliputians, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 210 (2001)); DOJ Blue Cross Press 
Release, supra note 54 (alleging that acquisition gave “Blue Cross-Michigan the ability to 
control physician reimbursement rates in a manner that could harm the quality of health 
care delivered to consumers”); Ganesh, supra note 6, at 1212; Kirkwood, Merger, supra 
note 33, at 79-82, 87-89; Porter, supra note 30, at 84 (“Intermediate customers gain 
significant bargaining power when they can influence the purchasing decisions of 
customers downstream. Consumer electronics retailers, jewelry retailers, and agricultural-
equipment distributors are examples of distribution channels that exert a strong influence 
on end customers.”). 
74
 Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33, at 82-84. 
75
 de Schutter, supra note 6, at 4. 
76
 Id. at 2 (noting how small-hold cocoa farmers in Cote d’Ivoire resorted to child 
labor); Green, supra note 6, at 10. 
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their children, especially girls, out of school. They can no longer 
afford basic medicines, and are cutting back on food. Beyond 
farming families, coffee traders are going out of business. National 
economies are suffering, and some banks are collapsing. 
Government funds are being squeezed dry, putting pressure on 
health and education and forcing governments further into debt.77 
 
So to the extent a jurisdiction treats human dignity as inviolable, its 
competition law cannot ignore the sellers’ welfare.  Its law must promote a 
competitive process that promotes (or at least does not hinder) many market 
participants’ access to food, work, and a livable wage.78  
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF MONOPSONY POWER 
The economic, social, and moral concerns of monopsony and buyer 
power, which Part I discusses, can be attacked on different fronts. The 
country, for example, can (i) assign buyer power problems in specific 
industries to a regulatory agency,79 and (ii) design laws, as in Japan and 
Korea, that specifically address common complaints of powerful buyers in 
particular sectors.80  On the antitrust front, the competition authorities can 
enjoin mergers that tend to create a monopsony or significantly increase the 
                                                 
77
 Oxfam, supra note 51, at 2 
78
 Ganesh, supra note 6, at 1229-30. 
79
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 10 (Executive Summary).  The UK 
Competition Commission, for example, has twice investigated the grocery market.  Its first 
inquiry, completed in 2000, resulted in a Code of Practice to regulate the relationship 
between the largest supermarkets and their suppliers. “However, the OFT received many 
complaints that the Code was not preventing supermarkets exploiting some of their 
suppliers, and putting many small shops out of business.”  Antony Seely, Business & 
Transport Section, Library, House of Commons, Supermarkets: Competition Inquiries into 
the Groceries Market, Standard Note: SN03653  (last updated Aug. 2, 2012), 
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03653.pdf. In 2008, “the Commission completed its 
inquiry, concluding that in many respects UK grocery retailers were ‘delivering a good deal 
for consumers’ but that action was ‘needed to improve competition in local markets and to 
address relationships between retailers and their suppliers,’ including a strengthened and 
revised Code of Practice, to be enforced by an independent ombudsman.” Id. 
80
 Id. at 192-96 (Japan) & 203-04 (Korea) (discussing its Fair Subcontract Transaction 
Act).  The JFTC Chair emphasized the importance of fairness and protecting besides 
consumers the rights of the players on a level playing field.  Id. at 191 (Japan).  The 
country’s laws specifically prohibit powerful retailers from common complaints, such as 
the “unjust return of goods,” unjust price reductions (after purchasing the product), and 
unjust assignment of work to employees of suppliers.  Id. at 194-95 (Japan). 
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anticompetitive risks from buyer power.81  They can prosecute group 
boycotts and collusion among buyers.82  This Part focuses on illegally 
maintaining or attaining a monopsony under section 2 of the Sherman Act.  
Section 2 prohibits any person to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce.”83   Since section 2 addresses the evils of 
concentrated economic power,84 it is a good starting point for evaluating 
monopsony claims. 
                                                 
81
 Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 33. 
82
 Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Soundview Technologies, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 
(D. Conn. 2001) (citing Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 244 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. Pa. 
1965) (“[c]oncerted refusals to buy are no less a violation of the antitrust law than 
concerted refusals to sell”), aff'd, 361 F.2d 451 (3d Cir.1966); Gould v. Control Laser 
Corp., 462 F. Supp. 685, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (declining to dismiss complaint alleging 
concerted refusal to buy; agreement not to take a license except under terms agreed by the 
group “unquestionably restrained the freedom of each group member to act as an individual 
producer in the laser market, free to contract or not contract with whom it chooses” and 
concluding that “competitive consequences of such collaborative decision making cannot 
be determined on the basis of the pleadings”)). 
83
 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
84
 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“[W]hatever 
difference of opinion there may be among economists as to the social and economic 
desirability of an unrestrained competitive system, it cannot be doubted that the Sherman 
Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public 
interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by maintenance of 
competition.”); see also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966) 
(“From this country’s beginning there has been an abiding and widespread fear of the evils 
which flow from monopoly—that is the concentration of economic power in the hands of a 
few.”); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309 (1948) (“Monopoly is a 
protean threat to fair prices.”); United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553–
54 (1944) (“‘Trusts’ and ‘monopolies’ were the terror of the period. Their power to fix 
prices, to restrict production, to crush small independent traders, and to concentrate large 
power in the few to the detriment of the many, were but some of numerous evils ascribed to 
them.”); United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923) (“The Sherman 
Act was intended to secure equality of opportunity, and to protect the public against evils 
commonly incident to monopolies, and those abnormal contracts and combinations which 
tend directly to suppress the conflict for advantage called competition—the play of the 
contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for gain.”); Charles A. 
Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S. & Can., 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923) (“The 
fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity and to 
protect the public against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through 
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.”). 
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A.  Proving Monopsony Power 
To prevail under section 2, the antitrust plaintiff must prove first that 
defendant possesses monopsony power, and second, “the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development 
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”85  
Having buyer power does not satisfy the first element.  Plaintiff must 
prove that defendant possesses monopsony power.  All monopsonists (like 
monopolists) have buyer (market) power, but not all firms with buyer 
(market) power are monopsonists (monopolists).86  Firms with buyer power 
enjoy more power than a price taker in a perfectly competitive market but 
less power than a monopsonist.  For example, the Coca-Cola Company 
increases its market power by acquiring a smaller competitor, Dr. Pepper.  
While the merger enables Coca-Cola to exercise market power (e.g., raise 
price, or diminish quality, service, innovation or another important facet of 
competition), Coca-Cola, given the competition from PepsiCo among 
others, is not a monopolist.  The difficult question then is how much buyer 
power is necessary to be a monopsonist.87 
Plaintiffs can prove monopsony power with direct evidence that the 
buyer depressed prices below the competitive level by withholding 
                                                 
85
 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966); see also In re Se. 
Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 724 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (setting out same 
elements for monopsony claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act). 
86
 EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 29, at § 8 (noting that both suppliers 
and buyers can have market power, but, for clarity, using market power to refer to a 
supplier's market power, and buyer power to refer to a buyer's market power). 
87
 Remarks on Single Firm Conduct, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2008) 
(Dennis Carlton) (noting the difficulty in making this distinction: “I mean, you can say that 
monopoly power is a lot of market power, but then what do you mean by a lot? And it's not 
a very precise distinction and that can cloud issues.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (“Monopoly power under § 2 [of the 
Sherman Act] requires, of course, something greater than market power under § 1.”). 
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purchases of goods and services.88  The problem is that direct evidence of 
monopsony (or monopoly) power is rare.89  As the German competition 
authorities observe, “the simple monopsony model often does not 
adequately reflect the reality of procurement markets.”90   
Plaintiffs typically prove market power circumstantially, with evidence 
of a high market share in a properly defined market protected by entry 
barriers.91  In monopolization claims, the threshold market share is typically 
high.92  If courts and agencies assume that monopsony is the mirror image 
                                                 
88
 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The 
existence of monopoly power may be proven through direct evidence of supracompetitive 
prices and restricted output.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. 
Cir.2001) (en banc). 
89
 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51 (observing that because direct proof of monopoly power is 
“rarely available, courts more typically examine market structure in search of 
circumstantial evidence of monopoly power”).  The D.C. Circuit also declined to adopt a 
rule requiring direct evidence to show monopoly power in any market.  Id. at 57.  One 
reason is that rarely is there a line that clearly demarcates what a defendant would or would 
not do if it possessed (or lacked) monopoly or monopsony power.  Id. 
90
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 176 (Germany). 
91
 See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51; I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 229 (6th ed. 2007). 
92
 See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 91, at 231-32 (“courts virtually 
never find monopoly power when market share is less than about 50 percent”); In re Se. 
Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 725 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (citing Byars v. Bluff 
City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 1979) (finding that 75–80 percent or 
greater is a “starting point” in assessing monopoly power); Smith Wholesale Co., 219 Fed. 
Appx. at 409 (56% market share insufficient); Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 
980 F.2d 171, 201 (3d Cir. 1992) (55 percent share insufficient); Arthur S. Langenderfer, 
Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1443 (6th Cir. 1990) (19–29 percent market shares 
insufficient and “there is substantial merit in a presumption that market shares below 50 or 
60% do not constitute market power” (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 
Section 578.3 (1988 Supp.))); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 
(2d Cir. 1945) (“it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four per cent” is sufficient “and 
certainly thirty-three percent is not”); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline 
Co., 885 F.2d 683, 694 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1989) (“While the Supreme Court has refused to 
specify a minimum market share necessary to indicate a defendant has monopoly power, 
lower courts generally require a minimum market share of between 70 percent and 80 
percent.”) (citing 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 12.6 (1980)); R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362 (M.D.N.C. 2002), aff'd sub nom. 67 
F. App'x 810 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Seventy to seventy-five per cent is generally considered the 
minimum market share necessary to support a finding of monopoly power.”); but see 
Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1981); Reazin 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 899 F.2d 951, 968 (10th Cir. 1990); Kolon Indus., 
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of monopoly, and that a 50 percent market share is insufficient for 
monopolization claims, should they similarly conclude that a 50 percent 
market share is insufficient for monopsonization claims? 
Some agencies and courts fall in this trap.  One U.S. district court 
recently dismissed a section 2 claim because the market share of around 40 
percent did not meet “the threshold of what it takes to establish monopoly 
or monopsony power.”93  The European Commission’s Vertical Guidelines 
also treat buyers’ and sellers’ market power similarly.  The Guidelines state 
that the sellers’ and buyers’ market shares are “decisive” in determining if 
the block exemption applies.94  So if the seller’s or buyer’s share in the 
market where it sells or purchases goods or services is 30 percent or less, its 
conduct, except for certain hardcore restrictions of competition, is 
presumptively legal.95 
One important distinction between monopoly and monopsony is the 
market share needed to infer significant power.96  Retailers with a 20 
percent market share can enjoy significant buyer power over sellers.97  In 
Toys-“R”-Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, the market shares fell 
below the ordinary thresholds for monopolization claims:  the retailer Toys-
“R”-Us accounted for 20 percent of the national wholesale market and up to 
49 percent of some local wholesale markets.98 The affected toy 
                                                                                                                            
Inc. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 3:11CV622, 2012 WL 1155218 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 
2012) (court considers besides market share defendant’s “ability to maintain power over 
pricing and competition for a significant period without erosion by new entry or 
expansion”). 
93
 In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 727 (E.D. Tenn. 2011). 
94
 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010/C 130/01, ¶ 87 
(2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/guidelines_vertical_en.pdf. 
95
 Id. at ¶ 23. 
96
 Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 295-96; Kirkwood, Merger, supra note 
33, at 35-38. 
97
 Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 12, at 295-96. 
98
 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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manufacturers collectively accounted for about 40 percent of the traditional 
toy market.99  Nonetheless, the FTC found, and the circuit court affirmed, 
that the group boycott, which the retailer orchestrated, was having its 
intended anticompetitive effect.  Toys-“R”-Us “was remarkably successful 
in causing the 10 major toy manufacturers to reduce output of toys to the 
warehouse clubs, and that reduction in output protected [Toys-“R”-Us] 
from having to lower its prices to meet the clubs’ price levels.”100  One 
could distinguish Toys-“R”-Us as a group boycott, rather than a monopsony 
case.  Moreover, Toys-“R”-Us was not a textbook monopsonist, whereby it 
purchased fewer toys to depress the market price.  But that ignores the fact 
that Toys-“R”-Us, despite its relatively low market share, had sufficient 
buyer power to accomplish its intended anticompetitive effects.  The 
retailer--without a dominant market share--was wielding its buyer power to 
induce the toy manufacturers to raise the costs of its new rivals, the 
warehouse clubs. 
If firms can enjoy monopsony power with a market share below 50 
percent, then agencies and courts cannot reflexively import the market share 
thresholds from monopolization cases to monopsonization cases.  Doing so 
significantly increases the risk of immunizing monopsonies from antitrust 
liability.  The U.S. competition authorities recognize the difficulty, “in the 
abstract, to state market share thresholds for such monopsony concerns.”101 
Rather than rely on market share thresholds alone to find monopsony 
power, they encourage the courts to consider several interrelated factors: 
(1) a large market share on the part of the purchaser; (2) an upward 
sloping or somewhat inelastic supply curve in the input market; 
and (3) an inability or unwillingness for new purchasers to enter 
the market or current purchasers to expand the amount of their 
                                                 
99
 Id.  
100
 Id. 
101
 DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 17. 
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purchases in the market.102  
 
This is the correct approach.  In explaining why reliance on market share 
alone can be misleading,103 Professors Blair and Harrison apply the 
following formula to measure the degree of buyer power (i.e., the 
percentage deviation from the competitive result):  

 
 
where 	 is the buyer’s market share, 
 is the elasticity of demand of the 
fringe buyers, and  is the overall elasticity of supply.104  From this formula, 
one can see that market share is one of several interrelated factors that 
determine buyer power.  Indeed in defining the relevant monopsony product 
and geographic markets, one should account both 
 and .105 
In assessing whether the defendant possesses monopsony power, the 
competition authority and court should consider first its market share, 	, 
namely the percentage share in either dollars or units of defendant’s 
purchases of that input.  
Next is the elasticity of fringe demand, 
, which is the capacity of 
alternative buyers to purchase the goods or services “without undue delay, 
risk, or cost.”106  The greater the widget sellers’ difficulty in turning to other 
                                                 
102
 Id. 
103
 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 60; Ganesh, supra note 6, at 1223; see also 
Cory S. Capps, Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 375, 
380, 383 (2009) (discussing how assessing buyer power in health insurance cases on the 
basis of shares of patients may understate the risk of harm, given the difference in 
reimbursement levels from commercially insured patients and Medicare and Medicaid 
patients). 
104
 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 58. 
105
 DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 15 (“whether the buyers of the input 
in the putative market successfully would be able to lower the price they pay for the input 
or whether, instead, the sellers have sufficient realistic alternatives to allow them to 
circumvent the price decrease”).   
106
 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 58-59; Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 
12, at 278; 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (“In defining relevant markets, 
the Agencies focus on the alternatives available to sellers in the face of a decrease in the 
price paid by a hypothetical monopsonist.”). 
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buyers to purchase their widgets, the greater the defendant’s buyer 
power.107  One factor is the difficulty of entry of other buyers.  If the 
defendant attempted to exercise monopsony power by offering too low a 
price, would that likely attract sufficient entry of other buyers to timely 
defeat the exercise of monopsony power? 
Third is the elasticity of supply, , namely the sellers’ ability and 
incentive to switch to providing other goods or services.  Buyer power 
depends in part on the captivity of the sellers in producing and selling that 
product.108  An apple orchard owner, facing a powerful buyer, may have 
fewer options than a carrot farmer, who may more readily switch to another 
crop (such as beets or turnips) the following year.   
To illustrate, suppose two firms in two different industries:  Firm A has 
a 60 percent market share; Firm B has a 40 percent market share.  If 
 and  
are the same in both industries, then we can conclude that Firm A enjoys 
more buyer power in its industry than Firm B in its industry.  But if we 
change the values of 
 and , then Firm B, despite its lower market share, 
can enjoy greater buyer power.   
Suppose in Firm A’s industry, 
 
• 
  2, in that the elasticity of demand of the fringe buyers is greater 
as they are willing to buy more of the sellers’ products should Firm 
A lower its purchase price, and 
•   2, in that sellers, if Firm A lower its price, can more readily 
switch from producing widgets to other things. 
 
                                                 
107
 If “the equation for measuring market power in monopsony is a mirror image of the 
relationships that create market power in a seller[],” then a “greater availability of 
substitute buyers indicates a smaller quantum of market power on the part of the buyers in 
question.” Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., CIV.A. 11-1600 
ESH, 2011 WL 5188081 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2011). 
108
 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (“Market power on the buying side 
of the market is not a significant concern if suppliers have numerous attractive outlets for 
their goods or services.”). 
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Firm B, despite its lower market share, now enjoys greater buyer power 
than Firm A if the elasticity of demand of the fringe buyers and the 
elasticity of supply are lower (say if both 
 and  equal 1).  
These three interrelated factors were evident in a recent DOJ action.  In 
2011, George’s Foods acquired Tyson Foods’ Harrisonburg, Virginia 
chicken processing plant.109  George’s and Tyson were two of the region’s 
three chicken processors that competed in producing, processing, and 
distributing chickens raised for meat products (“broilers”).  Post-
acquisition, George’s would control “approximately 43% of chicken 
processing capacity in the Shenandoah Valley, with only one other 
remaining competitor, Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation.”110  The DOJ alleged 
that the acquisition would lead to monopsony power.111  George’s could 
reduce below competitive levels the prices it paid to Shenandoah Valley 
area farmers who raised chickens for processors such as Tyson Foods and 
George’s. 
The antitrust plaintiff to prevail under section 7 of the Clayton Act must 
prove that the effect of the merger “may be substantially to lessen 
competition or to tend to create a monopoly.”112 In proving the former, the 
DOJ need not prove a merger to monopsony.  Here the DOJ alleged a 
merger to monopsony, and did so without relying on market share alone. If 
the antitrust agency and court simply assume that monopsonies are the 
mirror image of monopolies, they would conclude that George’s, with a 43 
percent market share, is not a monopsony.   
But the DOJ properly considered the other interrelated factors.  It first 
considered the industry’s inelastic supply: 
                                                 
109
 Compl., George’s, supra note 14. 
110
 Id. at ¶ 4. 
111
 Competitive Impact Statement, George’s, supra note 14, at 6 (“in short, the 
Transaction would lead George’s to exercise monopsony power”). 
112
 15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added). 
26 MONOPSONY [20-Aug-12 
In order to enter the chicken growing business, growers make 
significant investments that are highly specific to broiler 
production.  They must build chicken houses that may cost from 
$100,000 to $300,000, and have a 30-year economic life.  Many 
growers take out substantial loans in order to make these 
investments.  Chicken houses have no practical alternative use.  If 
a grower were to stop raising chickens, his or her best option 
would likely be to raze the chicken-raising facilities because 
converting a chicken house to a house suitable for another use 
involves substantial expense.  For instance, converting a chicken 
house to one suitable for turkey growing can cost more than 
$100,000.  Most chicken farmers would not abandon their 
investments in chicken houses in response to small decreases in the 
prices and other contract terms they receive for their services.113 
 
Next the DOJ considered the inelasticity of demand of fringe buyers. 
Post-acquisition the market’s remaining processor lacked “sufficient 
capacity to take on significant numbers of growers if George’s were to 
depress payments to growers.”114  
Finally the DOJ considered the difficulty in entering the broiler chicken 
processing industry: 
New entry into the production and sale of broiler chickens is costly 
and time consuming. Construction of a large-scale chicken 
processing facility would require investment of at least $35 million 
and take two or more years to obtain necessary permits, plan, 
design, and build. In addition, there are significant costs and 
inefficiencies associated with the start-up period of a new chicken 
processing facility. Repositioning by firms or facilities that 
slaughter primarily turkeys would require additional capital 
investment. Moreover, a turkey processor seeking to add chicken 
products to its offering would first need to find customers for its 
output prior to contracting with growers.115 
 
Entry therefore would be neither likely, timely nor sufficient to defeat a 
small but significant, non-transitory decrease in the price of broiler grower 
                                                 
113
 Compl., George’s, supra note 14, at ¶ 21. 
114
 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 28. 
115
 Id. at ¶ 30. 
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services. 
Consequently, courts and agencies can lessen the risk of false negatives 
by looking beyond market share thresholds.  Depending on the elasticity of 
demand of the fringe buyers 
 and overall supply , firms with 
relatively low market shares can enjoy as much, if not greater, buyer power 
than firms with higher market shares. Although George’s market share may 
not suggest monopsony power (if one simply applied the thresholds used in 
monopolization cases116), George’s nonetheless could “decrease prices or 
degrade contract terms to farmers for grower services in that region.”117   
The issue of false positives, however, remains.  Monopsonists can have 
low market shares, but many buyers with low market shares are not 
monopsonists.  Likewise all monopsonists possess buyer power, but not all 
firms with buyer power are monopsonists.  “Indeed,” observed the U.S. 
competition authorities, “because one of the purposes of managed care is to 
lower prices closer to a competitive level, it can be difficult to determine 
when a managed care purchaser is exercising monopsony power.”118 
Reduction in sellers’ output is not the telltale mark of monopsony, as 
buyers, for example, can price discriminate.  Quantifying 
 and  can be 
elusive, difficult, and contentious.119  
                                                 
116
 One could argue that market share thresholds are arbitrary for both monopsony and 
monopoly claims. Indeed the same factors to show George’s monopsony power, despite its 
relatively low market share, could show that a firm had monopoly power. In other words, 
when the elasticity of supply by fringe sellers and the elasticity of consumer demand are 
both low, a firm with a 43 percent market share could also exercise monopoly power. 
Plaintiffs, however, rarely challenge the market share thresholds per se. Instead the litigants 
debate whether the market should be defined more broadly or narrowly.  Nonetheless even 
in properly defined markets, buyers with low market shares at times can exert tremendous 
power.  Maybe buyers, in their ability in deciding when, whether, from whom, and how 
much to buy, generally have relatively more power than sellers; thus buyers can more 
effectively discipline sellers from exercising market power, than sellers can discipline 
buyers. 
117
 Compl., supra note 14, at ¶¶ 6, 28. 
118
 DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 18. 
119
 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 66. 
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Therefore in assessing monopsony claims, agencies and courts should 
use a sliding scale:  the lower the alleged monopsonist’s market share, the 
greater the plaintiff’s burden in showing the (i) fringe buyers’ inability to 
acquire more of the sellers’ output and (ii) sellers’ lack of alternatives to 
selling in the affected market (being unable to easily and cheaply produce 
and sell other products).120  Granted this is, at times, a matter of degree.  
The defendant can be a “hard-nosed actor in the market,”121 but not a 
monopsonist.  So a rule of thumb is the buyer’s coercion.  Coercion 
implicitly incorporates both 
 and :  as the sellers’ price is depressed, there 
remain few alternative buyers or alternative selling opportunities to rescue 
the sellers from exploitation and their captivity to the buyer.  The more the 
evidence shows that the defendant is forcing the seller “to do something that 
he would not do in a competitive market,” the more likely the defendant is a 
monopsonist, even when the defendant’s market share is relatively low.122  
The stronger the evidence of the buyer’s coercion, the stronger the inference 
of monopsony. 
B.  Proving Exclusionary or Predatory Conduct 
Monopsony, by itself, does not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.123  
A monopsonist, like a monopolist, “may be the survivor out of a group of 
active competitors, merely by virtue of [its] superior skill, foresight and 
industry.”124  A monopsonist, like a monopolist, in America can underpay 
its suppliers, overcharge its customers, provide inferior service and poor 
quality goods, be inefficient, and not innovate.125 
                                                 
120
 Id.  
121
 In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 727 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) 
122
 PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 817 (6th Cir. 1997). 
123
 White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co. LLC, 540 F. Supp. 2d 869, 888 (N.D. Ohio 
2008) (“Possession of monopsony power, like possession of monopoly power, is not an 
antitrust violation in and of itself,” citing BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 18, at 307); 
Salop, supra note 22, at 675. 
124
 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
125
 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
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Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit monopsony power by itself, 
the next challenge is determining whether the defendant sought to attain or 
maintain its monopsony by exclusionary and predatory conduct.  If the 
monopsonist, for example, is attempting to exclude rival purchasers on 
some basis other than efficiency, then courts likely will characterize the 
behavior as predatory or exclusionary.126 
Because few monopsony cases have been brought, what constitutes 
exclusionary and predatory monopsony behavior remains largely 
unexplored.  One interesting development will be the extent to which courts 
use the legal standards developed for monopolization claims (e.g., 
evaluating a monopolist’s tying, exclusive dealing, and refusal to deal) for 
monopsonization claims.  But as this Article discusses, monopsony is not 
the mirror image of monopoly.  So one can expect unique monopsonization 
theories, such as “naked overbuying,” where the defendant raises its rivals’ 
costs by purchasing (or manipulating the purchase price of) an input that its 
rivals, but not defendant, use in their production process.127  
In devising any legal standard for evaluating monopsony claims, the 
critical threshold issue is what harm counts. As the German 
Bundeskartellamt observed, one must discuss abuses of buyer power in 
terms of the basic objectives of competition law.128 Part III addresses 
whether courts and agencies should reconcile abuse of monopsony power 
claims with a consumer welfare objective.  Must antitrust plaintiffs prove 
harm to downstream consumers? 
III. USING CONSUMER WELFARE TO SCREEN MONOPSONY CLAIMS 
The OECD proposes that agencies and courts use consumer harm as a 
                                                                                                                            
398, 407 (2004). 
126
 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
127
 Salop, supra note 22, at 683-84 (raising and discussing naked overbuying). 
128
 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 175 (Germany). 
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threshold screen for buyer power claims.129  As it explained, “[r]eductions 
in input prices in the case of bargaining power are typically beneficial, so 
requiring an explanation of how increases in bargaining power would harm 
downstream consumers will help to avoid inadvertently deterring pro-
competitive behavior.”130  The European Commission likewise observed 
that “the ultimate end user of any product—the consumer—should be the 
centre of competition law.”131  The OECD and EC believe that predicting 
whether an increase in buyer power will have positive or negative effects is 
difficult. To avoid chilling a monopsonist’s pro-competitive behavior, 
agencies and courts should use consumer harm as a screen, namely that the 
upstream buyer’s conduct adversely affects the end consumer. 
Consumer welfare is indeed a popular antitrust objective.132  Thirty of 
thirty-three countries in a 2007 ICN survey identified promoting consumer 
welfare as an objective for their monopolization statutes.133 The EC noted 
how, “over the past two decades, the Commission’s antitrust and merger 
policy more effectively placed the emphasis on consumer welfare, notably 
through an increasingly refined economic analysis.”134  
But there are many problems with consumer welfare as the primary or 
sole antitrust goal.  Monopsony only highlights the infirmities.   
                                                 
129
 Id. at 10 (Executive Summary). 
130
 Id. at 9 (Executive Summary). 
131
 Id. at 255 (European Commission). 
132
 Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 570-71 
(2012); J. Thomas Rosch, Monopsony and the Meaning of “Consumer Welfare”:  A Closer 
Look at Weyerhaeuser, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 353, 353-54 (2007). 
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 Int’l Competition Network, Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, 
Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies 9 
(2007), available at  
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf.   Consumer 
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effective competitive process, and ahead of the goals, maximising efficiency and ensuring 
economic freedom. 
134
 European Commission, Report on Competition Policy 2010, COM(2011)328 final, 
at 5 (2011), available at ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/index.html. 
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A.  Why Doesn’t the Key Proponent of the Consumer Welfare Objective Use 
a Consumer Welfare Screen? 
Some United States courts135 and scholars136 in the past thirty years have 
been cheering globally for consumer welfare as antitrust’s primary 
objective.  But the quest in the United States over the past 30 years for a 
single economic objective was, as I discuss elsewhere, a failure.137  One 
need only look at monopsony power to see why. 
The U.S. courts, shortly after the Sherman Act’s enactment, recognized 
harm to sellers, independent of any harm to downstream consumers.  One 
early antitrust prosecution was against stockyard owners that bought and 
slaughtered livestock into fresh meats for human consumption.138 The 
defendants directed their purchasing agents at the stockyards “to refrain 
from bidding against each other when making purchases of such livestock, 
and by these means inducing and compelling the owners of such livestock 
to sell the same at less prices than they would receive if such bidding were 
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 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) 
(noting “antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition”); 
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (“Congress 
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firms with market power curtail output.”); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 
1421, 1444–45 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1995) (characterizing allocative efficiency as synonymous 
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M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (S.D. Cal. 1998); 
Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1997) 
(“’purpose of antitrust law is the promotion of consumer welfare’”) (quoting Reazin v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 960 (10th Cir. 1990))). 
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 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 91 (1978). 
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 Stucke, Goals, supra note 132, at 563-95. 
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 United States v. Swift & Co., 122 F. 529 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1903) modified, 196 U.S. 
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competitive.”139  But the fact that consumer surplus increased did not 
excuse the bid-rigging: 
Indeed, combination that leads directly to lower prices to the 
consumer may, within the doctrine of these cases, even as against 
the consumer, be restraint of trade; and combination that leads 
directly to higher prices, may, as against the producer be restraint 
of trade. The statute, thus interpreted, has no concern with prices, 
but looks solely to competition, and to the giving of competition 
full play, by making illegal any effort at restriction upon 
competition. Whatever combination has the direct and necessary 
effect of restricting competition, is, within the meaning of the 
Sherman Act as now interpreted, restraint of trade.140 
 
Likewise, the Supreme Court in 1948 held that the Sherman Act applies 
to buyer cartels that injure only sellers, and not customers or consumers.141 
The Sherman Act “does not confine its protection to consumers, or to 
purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the 
outlawed acts because they are done by any of these.”142  The Act “is 
comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made 
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.”143 
Even outside of cartel cases, courts are reluctant to apply a consumer 
welfare screen.  As one lower court said, 
This contention—questionable even in the monopoly context 
[citation omitted]—certainly cannot apply to monopsony claims. 
See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, et. al., Antitrust Law 
¶ 350b (2007) (“Notwithstanding numerous statements to the 
effect that the primary or even exclusive concern of antitrust is 
‘consumer’ welfare, upstream, or monopsony, injury to suppliers is 
treated in largely the same way as injury to consumers.”). In 
contrast to a monopoly, in a monopsony the buyer uses its market 
power to damage competition among upstream market participants. 
In such a situation, the direct victims are competitors and suppliers 
                                                 
139
 Swift & Co., 122 F. at 530. 
140
 Id. at 534. 
141
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rather than competitors and customers.144 
 
Similarly, the U.S. antitrust agencies do not use consumer harm to 
screen mergers.145  To dispel any uncertainty, the 2010 Merger Guidelines 
provide an example of an illegal merger that does not directly harm 
consumers: 
Example 24: Merging Firms A and B are the only two buyers in the relevant 
geographic market for an agricultural product. Their merger will enhance buyer 
power and depress the price paid to farmers for this product, causing a transfer 
of wealth from farmers to the merged firm and inefficiently reducing supply. 
These effects can arise even if the merger will not lead to any increase in the 
price charged by the merged firm for its output.146  
The U.S. agencies prosecute mergers to monopsony that affect solely 
suppliers, and not consumers: 
In Cargill,147 the Division challenged a merger that would have 
created a monopsony purchaser of grain in some local markets. 
The merging companies, however, sold grain in world markets, in 
which they faced competition from many other grain sellers. Thus, 
even if the merged firms imposed a loss on farmers by cutting back 
the quantity of grain they bought from them, consumers of the 
merging companies would not be harmed because they had 
numerous other sources of supply. The harm in the upstream 
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 White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co. LLC, 540 F. Supp. 2d 869, 888 (N.D. Ohio 
2008). 
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 See, e.g., 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 12 (“Nor do the Agencies 
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market, however, was sufficient to prompt the Division to 
challenge the merger.148 
 
So why doesn’t the United States--a leading cheerleader of the 
consumer welfare objective--advocate a consumer welfare screen for buyer 
power claims?  Several explanations exist. 
First, the Sherman Act, like some other jurisdictions’ antitrust statutes, 
does not expressly identify consumer welfare as the primary objective or 
require the agencies to use consumer welfare as a screen.149 
Second, the legislators in enacting the Sherman Act were concerned 
about buyer power’s adverse impact on sellers, apart from any injury to 
consumers.150 
Third, a consumer welfare screen produces anomalous results.  If the 
U.S. courts required the antitrust plaintiff to prove consumer harm in cases 
involving buyer power, otherwise per se illegal, and criminally prosecuted, 
behavior would become per se legal.  A bid-rigging cartel composed of 
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 DOJ & FTC Health Report, supra note 16, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted). 
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 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AND CONSUMER 
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Act: Consumer Welfare in A New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 714 (2007) (“The 
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ultimate buyers, for example, would be per se legal, while their counterpart 
sellers, if they colluded, would be incarcerated and fined.  Not surprisingly 
the United States does not distinguish between buyer and seller cartels, and 
actively prosecutes buyer cartels without considering their impact on 
consumers.151  
Although U.S. courts mention consumer welfare as an antitrust 
objective, in reality, the courts are more concerned about preserving 
competition.152   This raises other issues, including what is competition, as 
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competition-not the collusive fixing of prices at levels either low or high-that 
these statutes recognize as vital to the public interest. The Supreme Court's 
references to the goals of achieving “the lowest prices, the highest quality and 
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depress acquisition prices are tolerated. Every precedent in the field makes clear 
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participants in the relevant market.” 459 U.S. at 538, 103 S.Ct. 897. In 
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commodity, but upon the interplay of the economic forces of supply and 
demand.” Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 44, 172 P.2d 867 
(1946). 
See also W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 105 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Highmark’s improperly motivated exercise of monopsony power, like the collusive 
exercise of oligopsony power by the cheese makers in Knevelbaard, was anticompetitive 
and cannot be defended on the sole ground that it enabled Highmark to set lower premiums 
on its insurance plans.”). 
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the term is not self-defining, and what are the goals of competition law.153 
Recent buyer power cases, to the extent they state a specific goal, describe it 
as protecting suppliers from artificially low prices.154  
B.  Disagreement over Consumer Welfare 
A skeptic can reply that the fact that the United States does not apply a 
consumer welfare screen does not mean the screen is undesirable.  The 
United States simply is misguided. 
As I elaborate elsewhere, consumer welfare remains one of antitrust’s 
most abused terms.155  No consensus exists in the United States or globally 
on what consumer welfare actually means, who the consumers are, how to 
measure consumer welfare (if it is indeed measurable), or how to design 
legal standards to further this goal.156  Although one recent ICN survey of 
its member countries found “some agreement” on a consumer welfare 
objective,157 the ICN surveys also found that most countries did “not 
specifically define consumer welfare and appear[ed] to have different 
economic understandings of the term.”158  The ICN surveys suggest that the 
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 Stucke, Goals, supra note 132, at 570-77. 
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 Id.  
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 2011 ICN Survey, supra note 149, at 14.  
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 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL 
CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND 
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phrase “promoting consumer welfare,” provides little guidance as an 
antitrust goal.159  A former FTC Chair concluded the same: 
[T]he concept of “consumer welfare” and the principle of 
protecting “competition, not competitors” are so open-ended that 
their true meaning in practice depends on how they are applied. It 
is a relatively barren exercise for EU and US officials to invoke 
these phrases without taking the further difficult step of achieving 
agreement on what these phrases mean.160 
 
Consequently, it is illogical to advocate a consumer welfare screen given 
the current disagreement over what consumer welfare means, whether the 
agencies “examine effects on either or both of the direct customers and the 
final consumers,”161 and how consumer welfare is promoted.162 
C.  Risk of False Negatives under a Consumer Welfare Screen 
Even if competition authorities could overcome these obstacles, could 
agree on a definition of consumer welfare, say maximizing consumer 
surplus, and could identify the consumer whose surplus must be maximized, 
applying the consumer welfare screen remains problematic.  Proving harm 
to consumers is often difficult on the selling side—especially for 
intermediary goods.163  Proving buyer power’s adverse impact on the 
ultimate consumer is even more problematic and difficult.164  
A consumer welfare screen, when actually applied, provides an 
                                                                                                                            
STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 9 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ICN Report], available at 
http://www. internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf; see also 
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 William E. Kovacic, Chairman, US Federal Trade Comm’n, Competition Policy in 
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Annual Antitrust Conference 9 (June 2, 2008), available at 
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 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 1. 
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 Stucke, Goals, supra note 132, at 573-77. 
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 OECD, Monopsony, supra note 1, at 187 (Hungary). 
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incomplete and distorted assessment of consumer harm.  Antitrust enforcers 
typically consider the challenged behavior’s impact on short-term pricing 
effects.165 If retail prices are unchanged (or declining), then the competition 
authority, under a consumer harm screen, would likely conclude that the 
challenged practice is competitively neutral or pro-competitive. They would 
unlikely investigate further the complaints over buyer power, and would 
likely dismiss any non-price concerns as too tenuous or speculative.166 
This brings us to the fundamental difficulty in measuring consumer 
welfare.  As Subparts I.C and D discuss, buyer power can harm consumers, 
albeit indirectly, such as farmers who have less money to purchase goods 
that consumers produce and the increase in negative externalities when 
farmers with tighter margins cut corners by polluting more, engaging in less 
sustainable farming, allowing a more dangerous workplace, and hiring 
underage or illegal aliens.  Competition authorities generally do not 
consider these other harder-to-quantify harms, which may exceed the short-
term benefits from lower prices.167  The authorities are not willfully 
ignorant.  Rather they lack the tools to assess the short- and long-term 
harms arising from buyer power (e.g., higher prices, less variety, less 
innovation).168  Thus if a Wal-Mart depresses wages in a local community, 
which in turn increases the taxpayers’ costs, would that be factored in the 
agency’s consumer welfare screen?   Unlikely. 
Accordingly, given the difficulty in proving and quantifying consumer 
harm, the agency would use a simple, but incomplete, measure.  The agency 
assumes that monopsony power “usually results in higher prices 
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166
 de Schutter, supra note 6, at 5 (expressing concern over consumer welfare 
standard); South Centre & Traidcraft, supra note 6, at 20.  
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downstream.”169  Absent evidence of supra-competitive retail prices, the 
agency concludes that the challenged behavior is pro-competitive or 
competitively neutral.  This heuristic—assessing the restraint’s short-term 
impact on retail prices--increases the risk of false negatives.  It also leaves 
many consumers, who are also sellers, unprotected: “If competition policy 
is consistently focused on the welfare of the end consumer, those suppliers 
disadvantaged by buyer power could now and then find themselves in a 
rather defenceless position.”170 
D.  Risk of False Positives under a Consumer Welfare Screen 
As Subpart III.C shows, a consumer welfare screen, if narrowly applied, 
increases the risk of false negatives.  The screen excuses monopsony 
behavior that reduces, albeit indirectly, consumer welfare. 
One risk is that courts and agencies, confronted with a monopsonist’s 
unfair and abusive conduct, will construe consumer welfare so loosely that 
it serves more as a general principle than a standard to guide the instant 
analysis.171 
One economist stated that in most cases, “monopsony harms consumers 
because the distortions it creates in an input market reduce efficiency in 
final goods markets.”172  The OECD agrees.173  If true, then a consumer 
welfare screen is superfluous.  If the court finds that the defendant is a 
monopsony, and if monopsony power and its willful maintenance usually 
harm downstream consumers, then the key issue is whether the defendant is 
a monopsony.  The absence of direct evidence of consumer harm is not 
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determinative if one assumes that monopsony power and its willful 
maintenance ultimately harm consumers.  Consumers are (or will be) 
harmed, but the harm is not readily observable or measurable.  So in finding 
that the defendant has enough buyer power to be a monopsonist, the court 
or agency can conclude that consumers are somehow harmed.  The screen 
serves no real function.  
But monopsony, while harming sellers, does not always harm 
consumers.  Even here, courts, concerned about the monopsonist’s 
behavior, can hypothesize a string of future events leading to consumer 
harm:  The exercise of buyer power enables the defendant to lower its 
wholesale price, which significantly disadvantages defendant’s competitors, 
prompts their exit from the market, lessens competition over the long-term, 
and harms consumers.174  Alternatively, the court can rely on the waterbed 
effect as its theory of consumer harm: Buyer power nets lower prices or 
better terms for some firms but results in higher wholesale prices (or worse 
terms) for less powerful buyers, which in turn causes prices to increase 
downstream to the detriment of consumers.175    
One problem is predicting the subsequent anticompetitive 
consequences.  A defendant may use its buyer power to raise its rivals’ 
costs and increase its price accordingly; alternatively, the defendant lowers 
its retail price to squeeze out its competitors and take greater profits later.  
So under the waterbed effect, retail prices to consumers in the short-term 
may decrease, increase, or remain unchanged.176  
Courts and agencies plausibly can find consumer harm from the 
exercise of buyer power in the form of less innovation, lower quality goods, 
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 Id. at 11 (Executive Summary) & 176 (Germany) (“spiral effect”). 
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and less variety.177  With smaller margins, sellers have less incentive or 
ability to invest.178  If the powerful buyer captures Ricardian rents from the 
more efficient sellers, these sellers likely will testify of their disincentive to 
innovate, thereby harming downstream consumers.  Agencies and courts 
can reasonably find that lower “input prices may slow the rate of innovation 
and the adoption of socially desirable product improvements.”179  With all-
or-nothing contracts, “the inability to capture gains from innovative 
contributions to efficiency in production creates a disincentive to enter, 
expand, or innovate within the production sector.”180   
Other courts and agencies could plausibly conclude the opposite. By 
squeezing its suppliers and retarding innovation upstream, a monopsonist 
can increase the risk of being displaced by a superior innovation.181  Also 
attempts to squeeze sellers of their Ricardian rents increases the sellers’ 
incentives to differentiate their products and increase consumer demand for 
their branded product.182  The prospect of smaller margins would encourage 
sellers to invest in innovations that make them less dependent on the 
monopsony.  Moreover, powerful buyers, if rational, would want sellers to 
invest in innovations that likely increase buyer’s profits.183  Or to the extent 
the powerful buyers face rival technologies or competitors, they would not 
want to squeeze sellers’ margins below competitive levels.  Ford, for 
example, would not want to squeeze the margins of its automobile 
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component suppliers, if doing so disadvantages Ford competitively against 
General Motors and Toyota. 
Consequently, jurisdictions should not use consumer welfare to screen 
monopsony claims. Contrary to its aim, a consumer welfare screen, when 
applied, increases, rather than decreases, the risks and costs of false 
positives and negatives.  Rather than bring the monopsony legal standards 
closer to the rule of law, the screen promotes greater subjectivity and less 
predictability and transparency. It increases the difficulty for a generalist 
court to predict with confidence the eventual effects on consumer 
welfare.184 
E.  Behavioral Economics and Monopsony 
The OECD’s consumer harm screen implicitly assumes that market 
participants are interested primarily in maximizing their wealth.  Despite 
this simplifying assumption, subparts III.C and D show the practical 
difficulties in using consumer welfare as a threshold screen for monopsony 
cases.  The screen’s deficiencies are compounded as courts and agencies 
shift from the archaic assumption of self-interest to the more realistic 
premise, namely consumers’ other-regarding behavior and their concerns 
over fairness. 
The consumer harm screen implicitly assumes that consumers are solely 
concerned about promoting their self-interest;  this consumers are harmed, 
when they pay a higher price, get poorer quality goods, etc.  So when 
powerful meat packers earn supra-competitive profits by paying local 
farmers prices below the competitive level, absent evidence of higher retail 
prices, selfish consumers do not care.  Nor would selfish consumers care 
whether an Indonesian coffee grower receives a fair price for her harvest, 
has safe working conditions, enjoys a living wage, and has the right to 
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organize.  Selfish consumers do not care whether the farmers’ families can 
“eat better, keep their kids in school, improve [their] health and housing, 
and invest in the future.”185  Selfish consumers would not differentiate 
between Fair Trade coffee and regular (exploited farmer) coffee.  Given the 
pervasive greed, companies would not devote time and resources to ensure 
that the upstream coffee farmers earned higher than the minimum wage, 
received paid sick leave, had their school age children attending school, had 
not converted any natural forest habitat to coffee production areas, used 
organic matter or cover crops to improve or maintain soil fertility, or 
processed waste so as to not contaminate the local environment.186  
Responding to self-interested consumers, companies would seek to obtain 
the minimum acceptable quality inputs at the lowest possible cost.  A coffee 
house, for example, would not pursue a goal of having all of their coffee to 
be third-party verified or certified (through Coffee and Farmer Equity 
(C.A.F.E.) Practices, Fairtrade, or another externally audited systems),187 
when selfish consumers simply want a cheaper latte. 
Consumers, as the behavioral economics literature shows, are not solely 
concerned about promoting their economic self-interest.  Today fairness and 
other-regarding behavior are hot topics among economists188 and 
lawyers.189  The psychological and experimental economic evidence shows 
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that people care about treating others, and being treated, fairly.190  This 
“strong reciprocity” in human behavior entails “a predisposition to 
cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of 
cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that 
these costs will be repaid either by others or at a later date.”191  Employers, 
for example, may not reduce wages during times of deflation as workers 
perceive this wage reduction as unfair, and retaliate by working less hard.192  
So rather than self-interest, employers appeal to fairness concerns.193  
Likewise, in the behavioral experiments, people care about resources 
being equitably distributed, not solely about resources going to those with 
the greater use.194 The experiments in bargaining settings, economist 
Samuel Bowles summarizes, systematically show “that substantial fractions 
of most populations adhere to moral rules, willingly give to others, and 
punish those who offend standards of appropriate behavior, even at a cost to 
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themselves and with no expectation of material reward.”195   
Consumers are angrier and more willing to punish corporate behavior 
perceived as intentional, unfair, and motivated by greed.196  Even if one 
assumes that firms seek primarily to maximize wealth, consumers 
nonetheless consider whether the firm intentionally exploits others.197 
Suppose a retailer violated a pricing norm by charging higher prices to 
purchasers willing to pay more.  Such price discrimination, one study 
found, led to “specifically lower perceived fairness of the pricing, lower 
benevolence trust towards the firm, lower intention to purchase from this 
retailer, [and] higher likelihood of additional search” on competing retailer 
websites.198  Even when one study’s participants personally received a 
better price than other customers who were exploited, the participants still 
perceived the retailer as behaving unfairly, were less inclined to purchase 
from that retailer again, and less willing to recommend the retailer to a 
friend.199 
So the behavioral economics literature can better explain why firms 
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avoid behavior or statements that suggest intentional exploitation.  If 
consumers believe the company is exploiting its workers or suppliers, they 
can punish the corporate behavior—simply at times by taking their business 
elsewhere.  Indeed Senator Sherman assumed that competition checked the 
selfishness of firms and their disregard of consumers’ interests.200  In 
competitive markets, firms would be sensitive to social norms of fairness, 
and promote employee behavior that abided by these values.201  A positive 
reputation can provide a competitive advantage.202 
If firms are exploiting their workers or suppliers, then many consumers 
either (i) are unaware of the exploitation, (ii) do not care, or (iii) do care, but 
they, like the sellers, lack sufficient competitive alternatives.  Consumer 
ambivalence (option ii) is hard to reconcile with the behavioral experiments 
and today’s marketplace. Although consumers can economically benefit 
from the exploitation of sellers, they nonetheless object to such 
exploitation.203  We see this with Nike, Apple, and the growth of Fair Trade 
products: 
In 2011, Fair Trade USA and our industry partners delivered 
record impact to producers. Imports of Fair Trade Certified 
products grew to an all time high, satisfying the continued growth 
in consumer demand for the more than 11,000 products carrying 
our label in supermarkets, cafés, universities and workplaces. This 
growth was driven by longstanding business partners that 
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expanded their Fair Trade offerings as well as by new businesses 
joining us for the first time. In addition, consumer demand 
continued to grow, enabled by our consumer education campaigns 
which bring together brands, retailers, non-profits and community 
organizations. For example, during our annual Fair Trade Month 
promotion in October, Fair Trade USA and our partners actively 
engaged nearly 30 million consumers through various campaign 
activities, reinforcing the message that everyday purchases have 
the power to improve lives and protect the environment.204 
 
Consequently, to the extent consumers include in their welfare calculus the 
fair treatment of others, including upstream suppliers, then a consumer 
welfare screen, if realistic, must incorporate consumers’ other-regarding 
behavior and their concern over the exploitation of others. 
F.  Shared Value 
Subpart III.E assumes fairness as demand driven: Self-interested firms 
respond to consumer pressure to treat upstream suppliers fairly.  If 
unchecked by consumers or competition, the firms naturally would exploit 
their suppliers.  But business professor Michael Porter and consultant Mark 
Kramer recently discussed fairness as a supply driven response to yield 
greater profits.205  In the past, the concepts of sustainability, fairness, and 
profitability generally were seen as conflicting.  Under the neoclassical 
approach, companies “commoditize and exert maximum bargaining power 
on suppliers to drive down prices—even when purchasing from small 
businesses or subsistence-level farmers.”206  So the monopsonist, given the 
opportunity, would extract Ricardian rents from its more efficient suppliers 
and quasi-rents from its suppliers with lower short-run costs. 
One conundrum is that this exploitation makes little sense in the long 
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run.207   In extracting these rents, the monopsonist can retard innovation and 
investment and jeopardize its long-term competitiveness.  This exploitation, 
Porter and Kramer explain, destroys shared value.  Rather than zero-sum 
competition, whereby the monopsonist gains when its suppliers’ profits 
dwindle, they argue that greater profits can be achieved in “creating 
economic value . . . for society by addressing its needs and challenges” and 
“enhanc[ing] the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously 
advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which 
it operates.”208  Under their concept of shared value, powerful buyers 
recognize why exploitation is inconsistent with their long-term viability and 
profitability.  In promoting shared value, buyers recognize  
that marginalized suppliers cannot remain productive or sustain, 
much less improve, their quality. By increasing access to inputs, 
sharing technology, and providing financing, companies can 
improve supplier quality and productivity while ensuring access to 
growing volume. Improving productivity will often trump lower 
prices. As suppliers get stronger, their environmental impact often 
falls dramatically, which further improves their efficiency.  
 
In the context of buyer power, Porter and Kramer turn to the coffee sector 
and its challenges of a reliable supply:  
Most coffees are grown by small farmers in impoverished rural 
areas of Africa and Latin America, who are trapped in a cycle of 
low productivity, poor quality, and environmental degradation that 
limits production volume. To address these issues, Nestlé 
redesigned procurement. It worked intensively with its growers, 
providing advice on farming practices, guaranteeing bank loans, 
and helping secure inputs such as plant stock, pesticides, and 
fertilizers. Nestlé established local facilities to measure the quality 
of the coffee at the point of purchase, which allowed it to pay a 
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premium for better beans directly to the growers and thus improve 
their incentives. Greater yield per hectare and higher production 
quality increased growers’ incomes, and the environmental impact 
of farms shrank. Meanwhile, Nestlé’s reliable supply of good 
coffee grew significantly. Shared value was created. 
 
Embedded in the Nestlé example is a far broader insight, which is 
the advantage of buying from capable local suppliers. Outsourcing 
to other locations and countries creates transaction costs and 
inefficiencies that can offset lower wage and input costs. Capable 
local suppliers help firms avoid these costs and can reduce cycle 
time, increase flexibility, foster faster learning, and enable 
innovation. Buying local includes not only local companies but 
also local units of national or international companies. When firms 
buy locally, their suppliers can get stronger, increase their profits, 
hire more people, and pay better wages—all of which will benefit 
other businesses in the community. Shared value is created.209 
 
Consequently, shared value, like bounded self-interest, can promote 
capitalism.  Rather than fearing regulatory dictates to prevent them from 
exploiting suppliers (and lobbying governments on measures to promote 
such exploitation),210 enlightened firms will see how profits can be attained, 
not through exploitation (e.g., creating demand for harmful or useless 
products), but through collaboration and trust, and in better helping 
suppliers and consumers solve their problems. Sustainability, rather than a 
cost, represents an opportunity for companies to improve productivity and 
societal welfare. 
CONCLUSION 
Developing the legal standards for monopsonization claims will be 
more complex than simply mirroring the monopolization standards.  Courts 
and agencies cannot rely on market share thresholds alone as monopsonists 
can have relatively lower market shares.  Nor can they rely on a consumer 
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welfare screen premised on economic self-interest.  Accordingly, as one 
participant recognized about monopsony and buyer power, “the central 
economic issues facing the food system have little to do with economic 
efficiency, but a lot to do with fairness and economic freedom for farmers 
and ranchers.”211  The U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder agreed:  
the overriding concern we have in the Justice Department is 
maintaining fairness.  Doesn't mean we're going to put our thumb 
on the scale.  We want everybody to have a fair shot. . . . As [the 
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division] indicated, 
you know, big is not necessarily bad, but big can be bad if the 
power that comes from being big is misused, and that is simply not 
something that this Department of Justice is going to stand for.  
We will use every tool that we have to ensure fairness in the 
marketplace.212  
 
The challenge for the competition agencies is to develop these tools, in a 
way that promotes consumers’ concerns of fairness and the rule of law. 
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